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This paper attempts to model the relationship between monetary policy
and  nancial asset prices. We develop an aggregative model under foward-
looking rational expectations to analyse the optimal monetary policy re-
sponse to stock prices and exchange rates schocks. We  rst demonstrate
that a model ignoring the impact of equity prices and exchange rates on
aggregate demand leads to an overestimation of the optimal policy reponse
to standard shocks. Second, we clearly point out that a correct assesment
of the relation between optimal monetary policy and either equity prices or
exchange rates necessitates a model including both kinds of  nancial prices
simultaneously. Third, we show how these interactions between  nancial
asset prices and monetary policy are aﬀected by a particular form of coor-
dination between monetary policy and  scal policy, arising from a public
debt solvency constraint.1. Introduction
This paper attempts to clarify some speci c issues about the relation between
 nancial asset prices, such as equity prices and exchange rates, and monetary
policy. These issues involve the optimal monetary policy response to exchange
rate and equity price movements, and the feedback eﬀect of monetary policy on
the determination of these  nancial asset prices.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature several ways. First, we
demonstrate that a model ignoring the impact of equity prices and exchange
rates on aggregate demand leads to an overestimation of the optimal policy re-
sponse to standard demand shocks. Second, we clearly point out that a correct
assesment of the relation between optimal monetary policy and either equity
prices or exchange rates necessitates a model including both kinds of  nancial
prices simultaneously. Third, we show how these interactions between  nancial
asset prices and monetary policy are aﬀected by a particular form of coordi-
nation between monetary policy and  scal policy, arising from a public debt
solvency constraint.
The view taken in this paper is that the main task of Central Banks is to
control in ation, which heavily depends on the output gap. This is the reason
why Central Banks try to stabilize aggregate demand through a  ne tuning of
short term interest rates. Interest rates aﬀect aggregate demand both directly
and indirectly. Aggregate demand directly depends on interest rates through
their eﬀects on investment and consumption expenditures. But interest rates
also aﬀect aggregate demand indirectly, through their eﬀects on exchange rates
and equity prices. It is indeed well established that exchange rate movements in-
 uence net exports. It is also widely recognized that equity prices aﬀect private
consumption and corporate investment. High equity prices increase consumers
wealth and boost consumption (see Ludvigson and Steindel, 1999 for an empir-
ical assessment). High equity prices also increase Tobin s Q and improve  rms
ability to raise funds in the markets or to borrow from the banks. Therefore,
 nancial asset prices such as exchange rates and equity prices are an essential
part of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Two aspects of this is-
sue deserve particluar attention. First, even when monetary policy reacts to
unexpected aggregate demand  uctuations which are independent of any ini-
tial movement of equity prices or exchange rates, these  nancial asset prices
ultimately move because they are directly aﬀected by the interest rate reaction
decided by the Central Bank. Second, when deciding of how much the interest
2rate has to be changed in response to some shock of aggregate demand and in or-
der to achieve a particular in ation objective monetary authorities have to take
account of the induced movements in  nancial asset prices which in turn aﬀect
aggregate demand and in ation. This is one of the reasons why some Central
Banks adjust their policy by relying on a Monetary Conditions Indicator which
generally contains at least a short-term interest rate and an exchange rate, as
an operating target. It is our view that for reasons outlined above, equity prices
should be incorporated in such a Monetary Conditions Indicator. In this paper
we derive such an augmented MCI from optimal central bank behaviour.
In our paper the analysis is conducted within the framework of an aggregative
model which is a variant of a standard Barro-Gordon (1983) model, with supply
and demand shocks. We add to the model some arbitrage equations describing
the stochastic dynamics of asset prices. Each of these equations contains a sys-
tematic part and a stochastic unsystematic part, modelled as a random shock.
Solving this model yields, under the optimal monetary policy rule described
by the MCI relation, the reactions of interest rates, exchange rates and equity
prices to the various shocks aﬀecting the economy, including shocks to  nan-
cial asset prices. The interpretation of these shocks deserves some comments.
Volatility is a normal attribute of  nancial asset prices since their  uctuations
are theoretically governed by revisions of the expected future values of their
determinants. But  nancial prices may also  uctuate in response to exogenous
variations of risk premia. Insofar as they aﬀect the output gap and the in ation
outlook these shocks in uence monetary policy.
We do not address the question as to whether monetary policy should re-
spond to bubbles which may lead equity prices and exchange rates levels to
depart considerably from their theoretical values. It is often argued that eq-
uity prices and exchange rates sometimes display excessive volatility, which is
not warranted by the evolution of their fundamental determinants according
to economic theory. We concede that a concern about bubbles and asset price
stabilization by monetary policy can be well motivated. Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) explain that non fundamental factors sometimes underlie asset market
volatility because of poor regulatory practice and imperfect rationality on the
part of investors. The question often arises as to whether monetary auhori-
ties have to react to those exogenous  uctuations of  nancial asset prices that
are not justi ed by their fundamentals. It is however true that is very diﬃ-
cult to decide whether a given change in asset value results from fundamental
factors or not, as shown by Cogley (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
3Therefore unsystematic changes of  nancial prices are interpreted in this paper
as stochastic changes of the risk premium. Moreover a correct assessment of
the mechanism via which non-fundamental movements in asset prices may dis-
rupt the economy necessitates a model whose assumptions diﬀer from ours, see
Bernanke and Gertler (1999). These authors anyway conclude that monetary
authorities should not try to stabilize  nancial prices per se but should simply
attempt to control in ation. As a by product such an in ation targeting policy
may contribute to smooth the variance of  nancial prices.
To deal with some of the issues addressed in this paper, some pioneering
work has been undertaken by Gerlach and Smets (1996) and Smets (1997), but
the models in these papers involve only one asset price (whatever its interpre-
tation). The optimal monetary policy response to exchange rate movements
is modelled in a paper by Gerlach and Smets (1996). In a connected paper,
Smets (1997) models the interaction between monetary policy and equity prices
 uctuations. In this latter paper, Smets points out a close analytical similarity
between modelling the role of equity prices and modelling the role of exchange
rate. He therefore claims that his model may also be interpreted as dealing with
the relation between monetary policy and exchange rates rather than equity
prices. Our paper however demonstrates that it is necessarily to include both
kinds of  nancial prices in the model in order to correctly assess their impact
on monetary policy.
This paper extends previous analyses several ways. In the real world several
kinds of asset prices simultaneously interact with monetary policy. This implies
that a shock on one particular asset price aﬀects other asset prices through the
monetary policy response it implies. When monitoring its interest rate response
to a shock on a particular asset price, the Central Bank has to take account of
the induced eﬀects on other asset prices and their feedback on the one which
was initially aﬀected. Our work attempts to clarify this interaction between
intervention interest rates, equity prices and exchange rates. We show that a
correct assesment of optimal monetary policy necessitates to model the role of
both kinds of  nancial prices simultaneously. We explicitly introduce two assets:
equities and exchange rates. In spite of the analytical complexity induced by
this exercise, we think that this eﬀort is justi ed by the above arguments. It
may also be pointed out that the analytical similarity in modelling the role of
equities and exchange rates is only partial. Contrary to exchange rates, equity
prices are indeed directly aﬀected by the expected value of some real variables.
Exchange rates are only indirectly aﬀected by expected real variables through
4the induced variations of interest rates.
Another original feature of our base model is that we explicitly describe
how wages and productivity, and therefore pro tability, may aﬀect  nancial
asset prices and monetary policy. To achieve this objective we assume that real
dividends depend on the wedge between real production and real wage costs.
A major contribution of our analysis is that we examine how the interaction
between monetary policy and  nancial asset prices is aﬀected by the introduc-
tion of  scal policy in the model. We thus specify an extended model involving
a particular form of coordination between monetary policy and  scal policy.
This coordination arises from a public debt solvency constraint. In most indus-
trial countries, some form of real debt stabilisation requirement is binding (an
example is provided by the European Stability Pact but similar objectives are
observed in the United States and many other countries). Any contracyclical
movement of monetary policy is accompanied by a similar contracyclical move-
ment of  scal policy. Our opinion is that any discussion about monetary policy
issues has to take account of this point. We therefore take explicitly account
of a public debt solvency constraint, inspired by Krichel, Livine and Pearlman
(1996) and Van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995). This constraint establishes
a strong link between  scal and monetary policies, since monetary policy de-
termines in ation and seignoriage. We derive how the optimal monetary policy
response to shocks on  nancial asset prices is aﬀected when we take account
of the necessary adjustment of government expenditure. For clarity of exposi-
tion, and to highlight the speci c features of the results implied by monetary
and budgetary policy coordination, we  rst develop a base model without  scal
policy. Thereafter we extend the analysis to take account of  scal policy.
We thus develop a model where aggregate demand depends on real equity
prices and a real exchange rate. In this model, the Central Bank is assumed to
have an objective function depending on output deviation from a natural level
and domestic output price in ation deviation from a target level, as described
above. Following Barro and Broadbent (1997), Gerlach and Smets (1996) and
Smets (1997), our paper assumes that monetary authorities minimize a quadratic
loss function depending on deviations of output from its potential or natural level
and deviations of in ation from its target level. This objective implies that the
Central Bank has no incentive to surprise the private sector with in ation, even
in response to supply shocks, contrary to what happens in Barro and Gordon
(1983).
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2.1. Description of the behaviour of private agents
and Barro (1997), which avoids some of the cumbersome calculation associated
with solving rational expectations models with an explicit goal for the monetary
authority. However, since our model contains endogenous  nancial asset prices,
the analytical derivation of the solutions requires some additional steps. We have
to solve a system of two simultaneous  rst order diﬀerence equations which we
transform into two independent second order diﬀerence equations.
The structure of the paper is organised as follows. This introduction is the
 rst section of the paper. Section 2 develops the base model. Section 3 derives
the main properties of optimal monetary policy under output gap stabilisation
and in ation rate targeting. These properties allow us to derive a monetary
conditions index which describes optimal monetary policy in the context of our
base model. Section 4 solves the model, and the outcome is discussed at length.
Section 5 develops an extension of the model:  scal policy is introduced under
a binding debt solvency constraint. Section 6 concludes The paper involves
some cumbersome calculations but we focus on economic analysis, so that most
analytical derivations are presented in appendices.
We develop a simple aggregative model under rational expectations, to analyse
the optimal monetary policy response to stock prices and exchange rates shocks.
The log of aggregate demand is assumed to depend negatively on the expected
real interest rate, positively on the log of a real stock price , and negatively on
the log of the real exchange rate of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign
currency:
(2.1)
In this equation denotes the nominal interest rate and is the in ation
rate on date t+1, so that is the expected real interest rate since
is the expectation operator conditioned on information available on date t. The
log of the real exchange rate is given by where is the log of the
nominal exchange rate while and denote the logs of domestic and foreign
prices respectively. The exchange rate is the price of the domestic currency
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In this context the nominal stock price is determined by a dividend discount model where
the discount rate, or required return on equity, is the nominal interest rate on non risky
assets augmented by a risk premium which  uctuates randomly.
(2.2)
The log of date t output, diﬀers from its natural or  exible-price equilibrium
level, , by an amount proportional to the wedge between realised and expected
prices (the price forecast error):
(2.3)
where denotes a supply shock (for example random  uctuations in the pro-
ductivity of capital, or stochastic shifts in the the labour supply curve) while
is a constant. Such a supply function is usual in this kind of literature (see
for example Broadbent and Barro, 1997) and can be rationalised by incomplete
information about current prices or wages (Lucas, 1973 or Barro, 1976). Eq.
2.3 then re ects the maximizing behaviour of private agents on localized mar-
kets where they have only partial information about contemporaneous nominal
aggregates. In these settings depends on the relative variances for general and
market-speci c shocks. Such a supply function can also be motivated by some
forms of nominal labour contracts (see Gray, 1976 or Fischer, 1977). Supply is
thus governed by innovations in aggregate producer prices and some exogenous
stochastic process. Note also that is equal to so that
aggregate supply increases with surprises in the in ation rate.
Domestic prices adjust to equal supply and demand. Therefore production
satis es the following equilibrium condition:
(2.4)
The real stock price follows an arbitrage condition according to which the
expected real return on equities must be equal to the expected real riskless
interest rate plus a time-varying risk premium . A log-linear approximation of
this arbitrage condition, derived in appendix 1, is given by :
(2.5)
where denotes the log of real dividends on date t+1. This log-linear ap-
proximation is standard, see for example Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997,
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denotes the expected real return on equities, which is a convex combination of
the expected capital gain and the expected dividend yield. Note that we do not
interpret as a bubble which would represent the eﬀects of self-ful lling fore-
casts on securities markets. Therefore does not necessarily re ect variations
in asset prices that are unrelated to fundamentals. We prefer to consider as a
random  uctuation of the risk premium due to stochastic exogenous changes in
investors risk aversion. To introduce a bubble in asset prices is irrelevant given
the purposes of this paper because a bubble is not easily identi ed. Cogley
(1999) convincingly argues that identi cation of asset prices bubbles requires
more knowledge about asset price fundamentals than central banks possess.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) show that even when a bubble is present, the mar-
ket price can still be expressed as a discounted stream of cash  ows, though with
a discount rate that diﬀers from the fundamental rate. In order to capture the
eﬀects of labour productivity and wage formation on pro tability, we assume
that date t+1 real dividends are equal to the wedge between real production
and real wage costs on date t. A log-linear approximation of this hypothesis is
given by
(2.6)
where denotes the log of the real wage rate on date t. This approximation is
derived in appendix 2, where it is shown that depends on labour productivity.
The ex ante real stock price is given by
(2.7)
where is the log of the nominal stock price and denotes the perceived
price level, since is not observed on date t. Let be the log of the nominal
wage rate. The ex ante real wage rate is de ned by
(2.8)
while private agents commit themselves to nominal wage contracts one pe-
riod before the contracts come into eﬀect. Since they care about real wages,
wage setters form expectations on next period s in ation, to know what
nominal wage to commit to in advance. If workers always commit to a wage
that sets expected output at its natural level, nominal wage contracts satisfy
If forecasts turn out to be wrong, real wages may deviate
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These assumptions are consistent with the hypotheses underlying eq. 2.3 . We
also assume that, after supply decisions have been made , nominal wages may
diﬀer from contracts by some wage shock so that
(2.9)
Nominal exchange rates follow a standard uncovered interest rates parity condi-
tion, according to which the cross-country interest rate spread must re ect the
anticipated change of the bilateral exchange rate :
(2.10)
where denotes the foreign interest rate and is a time-varying risk premium
arising from speculative exchange market pressures.
In our model describing the functioning of the economy, the variables , , ,
, , , , and are endogenous, while , and are exogenous. However
is set by the Central Bank, so that it is suﬃcient to add an equation describing
optimal monetary policy to make endogenous. Before doing this we detail
our hypotheses about the informational structure in the economy, and we derive
some implications of the model concerning the equilibrium price level.
Following Broadbent and Barro (1997) we assume that the aggregate price and
output levels cannot be observable contemporaneously. They are only observed
9
Eq. (1.3), rewritten as may also be derived by assuming that
prices are set as a mark-up over wages and that wages are set one period in advance, see Can-
zoneri and Henderson (1991). The mark-up increases with the output gap. This interpretation
is chosen by Smets (1997).
Nominal wage contracts are set on date t-1, on the basis of expected in ation. On date
t, given these nominal wage contracts, each  rm i observes its own selling price (but not
the average price ) and faces a real wage contract level which may diﬀer from the previously
expected one. Given this real wage contract level, the output of each  rm is determined, leading
to the well known aggregate supply function (1.3). After production decisions have been made,
labour market shocks may imply some departure of nominal wages from their contract levels,
thereby aﬀecting pro tability and dividends. This hypothesis about the timing of the wage
shock allows not to interfere with the micro-foundations of eq. (1.3). Readers who do not
like this story may simply assume that is equal to 0 everywhere. This shock does not play
any role in the main results of this paper. It is simply a convenient way to introduce a random
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An individual agent may contemporaneously observe the output and price levels of the
paticular market on which he is acting, but not the aggregate values of all the markets.
with a lag of one period . However all agents observe the current value of
nominal  nancial asset prices, exchange rates and interest rates. Contrary to
aggregate price and output data,  nancial variables are immediately observable
on the markets in which they are quoted. We also assume that the aggregate
demand disturbance is  rst order autocorrelated, where is
white noise, while the supply shock is a random walk, where
is white noise. The other shocks, and , are supposed to be white noise.
Note that if was a bubble it should be such that which is not
compatible with the white noise hypothesis.
Equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) combine to yield
(2.11)
which using (2.7) implies that
(2.12)
This is the rule that prices must follow to clear the goods market. Since the
current price level is unobservable, people may only rely on a guess about this
price level using available information. This guess is the price perception
Taking the expectation of both sides of equation 2.12, we see that must
follow
(2.13)
Let be the price perception error . Since and
it is easy to derive the value of substracting eq. 2.13 from eq.2.12:
(2.14)
The concepts of price perception and price perception error will prove to be
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3. Optimal monetary policy under output gap stabilisa-
tion and in ation rate targeting
In this paper monetary policy is entirely de ned as a feedback rule and does not contain
an unsystematic component or monetary shock. For a discussion of the issues implied by such
shocks, see Christiano and al. (1998).
In this section we derive the optimal monetary policy for a particular form of
authority s objective, following Broadbent and Barro (1997). The loss function
that the Central Bank minimizes is a weighted sum of squared deviations from
an output target of and an in ation target of A strictly positive value of
may involve the governments s optimal rate of taxation of cash balances, since
the government obtains revenue from printing money (see for example Barro
and Gordon (1983), with however a quite diﬀerent output target). Formally,
the policy maker s objective is
(3.1)
There is an arbitrage between minimizing the output gap and stabilizing the
in ation rate. The coeﬃcient is the relative weight the authorities attach to
attaining their in ation target. This loss function reduces to
using eqs. (2.2) and (2.3). Indeed the ouput gap depends on the price forecast
error. In this model the Central Bank sets the interest rate level in order to
control the price level . There is an arbitrage between hitting the in ation target
and holding down forecast errors in the aggregate price level. However, the
monetary authorities cannot control the aggregate price level perfectly because
they are not contemporaneously observable. This feature inevitably introduces a
degree of error in the control of prices, equal to The Central Bank may only
control the perceived price The monetary authorities select an optimal
expected equilibrium point on the aggregate supply curve, corresponding to
some particular value of where expected output is equal to
The Central Bank then controls the nominal interest rate to
shift aggregate demand and thereby hits the desired expected equilibrium point.
Therefore we may  rst think of the Central Bank as picking an optimal value
for perceived prices although we can ultimately express the results in terms
of settings for the nominal interest rate level .
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It may be interesting to note that the objective function of the Central Bank could have
been initially written as an intertemporal choice problem:
where is a constant discount rate. However, to derive the solution for , this intertemporal
objective reduces to a one-period choice problem:
which is equivalent to eq. (3.2). Two reasons explain why an intertemporal problem reduces here
to a static one. The  rst one is that the structure of the model is such that future expectations
are independent of The second reason is that the current choice of the value
of has no impact on future output gaps and implies no direct constraints on future choices
There is thus no channel for to aﬀect future costs in the intertemporal loss
function.
prior expectations since we assume that policy is conducted without a
pre-commitment ability. But expectations are rational, so that private agents
know that monetary authorities are in this position. Private agents formulate
their expectations by eﬀectively solving the problem that the Central Bank
has to solve. Monetary policy is thus the outcome of a non-cooperative game
between the Central Bank and private agents. However, since the objective
function is such that there is no reason to behave in a time-inconsistent manner,
the rules-based and discretionary solutions would coincide in this case.
In the next developments we use a novel methodology, introduced by Broad-
bent and Barro (1997), which avoids some of the cumbersome calculation as-
sociated with solving rational expectations models with an explicit goal for the
monetary authority. Conventional techniques generally require solving the whole
model before substituting this solution into the objective function and deriving
the optimal rule. Here we derive the optimal monetary policy rule before solving
the model.
It is thus convenientto rewrite the Central Bank s objective in terms of perceived
prices :
(3.2)
The  rst-order condition characterizing the optimum implies
(3.3)
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which reduces to
(3.5)





The output gap then becomes from eqs. 2.3, 2.14, 3.5 and 3.7 :
(3.8)
Equation (3.7) summarizes the optimal monetary policy which can also be de-
scribed in terms of perceived in ation:
(3.9)
The monetary authorities enforce a perceived in ation rate which is equal to the
target adjusted for the previous perception error. The unobservability of the
price level for one period indeed leads to the presence of the price perception
error on date t-1 in the optimal price perception on date t. This feature, which
might seem confusing at  rst sight, is a mechanical implication of the model and
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The task of the Central Bank is to adjust the nominal interest rate in re-
sponse to the various shocks aﬀecting the economy, to make sure that
follows (3.7). Therefore shocks such as and directly in uence the setting of
nominal interest rates. However, there is a  feedback eﬀect  of nominal interest
rates on  nancial asset prices and . By setting the nominal interest rates, the
Central Bank also aﬀects the levels of stock prices and the exchange rate. Nom-
inal interest rates aﬀect aggregate demand directly (the intensity of this direct
eﬀect is measured by and indirectly through the channel of stock prices and
exchange rates. Financial variables , and are determined simultaneously.
We address these issues in the next section.
Substituting eqs. (3.5), (3.7) and (3.11) into (2.13), and rearranging, we obtain
(4.1)
This equation may be interpreted as a rule that the nominal interest rate level
must follow, but it is not a reduced form solution since and are endogenous.
It may be pointed out that, in this relation, interest rates are a positive function
of equity prices but a negative one of exchange rates. This observation must
be interpreted with care since all variables are endogenous. For example, a
positive exogenous shock on equity prices ( boosts aggregate demand
and the Central Bank reacts by increasing the intervention interest rate. But
this is not the whole story: higher interest rates have a negative eﬀect on equity
prices (which moderates the initial hike) and a negative eﬀect on exchange rates.
Similarly, a positive exogenous shock on the exchange rate ( depresses
aggregate demand and induces a downward adjustment of the interest rate by
monetary authorities, which involves a lot of additional variations of  nancial
asset prices.
Using eq. (4.1) implies that the Central Bank
controls the nominal interest rate in such a way that a weighted average of
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4.2. Explicit solutions for interest rates, exchange rates and stock
prices
MCI
MCI  R  L  e c  ε ε
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demand and supply shocks. This weighted average represents what is called a
monetary condition indicator ( ) by Central Bank policy makers :
(4.2)
where
The weights of the components in the MCI depend on their respective eﬀect
on aggregate demand. Absent , eq. (4.2) is a general form in which some
particular cases proposed in the recent literature are nested. If eq. (4.2)
reduces to the case studied by Gerlach and Smets (1996) while if eq.
(4.2) corresponds to the case analysed by Smets (1997). Notice that in this
framework contemporaneous shocks to supply and demand are unobservable,
the MCI depends upon past supply and demand shocks.
To interpret eq. (4.2) correctly, it must be remembered that and are
endogenous. To set at its desired value, the Central Bank does not move
conditional to exogenous values of equity prices and exchange rates. To
achieve the equality described by (4.2), some  ne tuning of interest rates is
necessary, taking account of the fact that equity prices and exchange rates react
to movements in interest rates.
Using equation (2.7), the arbitrage condition eq. (2.5) may be rewritten in
nominal terms:
(4.3)
Substituting eqs. (2.6) and (2.8) into this equation yields:
(4.4)
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(4.5)
Similarly, substituting eq. (4.1) into the uncovered interest rate parity con-
dition eq. (2.10) yields
(4.6)
Collecting the terms in , eq. (4.6) implies that :
(4.7)
Eqs. (4.5) and (4.7) form a system of two linear equations in and
conditioned on expectations and Taking these expectations as
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Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9) form a system of two linear  rst-order diﬀerence equations
in the nominal stock price and the nominal exchange rate . This system is
solved in Appendix 3, where the appropriate dynamic stability conditions are
derived, and yields the following solutions :
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In the solutions above we have neglected the terms in which do not
deserve any interest (the value of is arbitrary). We also assumed that the
foreign interest rate is constant ( ), and that expectations about
foreign prices are formulated according to the simple rule :
, where is the constant foreign in ation rate. Substituting these
solutions in eq. (4.2) where , we obtain the explicit solution for
the interest rate :
(4.12)
Note that the variance of equilibrium interest rates is given by :
(4.13)
under the assumption that , , and are mutually independent. The














4.3.1. Eﬀects of supply and demand shocks
In this subsection we comment on the above solutions. In particular we discuss
the eﬀect of various random shocks and exogenous variables on equity prices,
exchange rates and interest rates.
From the discussion which follows, some important lessons may be drawn.
- When monetary policy takes account of the role played by  nancial prices in
the monetary transmission mechanism the optimal monetary policy reaction to a
demand shock is inferior to what it would have been otherwise. This reduction
of the magnitude of the interest rates reaction increases with the impact of
 nancial prices on aggregate demand.
- This feature of the solutions has interesting implications since there are
good reasons to assume that the impacts of  nancial prices on aggregate de-
mand change over time. For example it may be suspected that the sensibility
of consumer demand with respect to the value of equities has recently increased
as the result of increasing stock holding by households. Therefore should have
increased. An important consequence of this structural change is that the op-
timal monetary policy reaction to demand shocks should have decreased. This
argument would imply a reduction of the volatility of intervention interest rates
for a given level of the variance of aggregate demand.
- In an in ation targeting framework, monetary policy must react to unan-
ticipated changes in asset prices only to the extent that they aﬀect the output
gap and thus the in ation outlook. To correctly assess the optimal response of
interest rates to exogenous changes of the stochastic risk premia on equity prices
and exchange rates, is is necessary to include both kinds of  nancial prices in
the model because of their interaction.
When setting interest rates, the Central Bank targets perceived prices .
Equity prices and exchange rates also depend on expectations conditioned on
information available on period t (see eqs. (2.5) and (2.10)). Because contem-
porary supply and demand shocks and are not in the date t information
set, they do not aﬀect expectations made on date t about future variables. This
is the reason why they do not in uence and
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Eﬀects of past demand shocks
Eﬀects of past supply shocks
In US data over the period 1926 to 1994, is about in annual data (see Campbell and
al., 1997 or Cogley, 1999). This is a prudent choice since this estimate would be higher if the
recent run-up in stock prices was included in the sample. The value of is arbitrarly chosen
as the mean of its acceptable values. It is very hard to estimate due to the simultaneity of
real demand and interest rates (see for example Barro and Broadbent, 1997). Therefore a small
value like is a conservative choice.
For the same reason has no eﬀect on if this shock is permanent ( ).
Perceived prices, which must be equalized
to their optimal level given by eq. 2.7, depend on expected demand shocks to the
output gap (see eq.(2.13)). Expected demand shocks in turn are a function of
past supply and demand shocks. Therefore the interest rate, which is controled
to hit the desired level of perceived prices, is aﬀected positively by past demand
shocks. Being a function of interest rates (see eqs. (2.5) and (2.7)), nominal
asset prices also depend on at equilibrium.
Equity prices decrease with a positive past demand shock because interest rates
increase, while expected future dividends are unaﬀected since expected future
output remains constant. Nominal exchange rates increase with a positive past
demand shock because interest rates increase.
For given volatilities of the other stochastic shocks, the eﬀect of the volatility
of demand shocks on the volatility of interest rates is a negative function of
and . Indeed,
which clearly shows that, for a given variance of demand shocks, the volatility
of interest rates is smoothed by the impacts of equity prices and exchange rates
on aggregate demand. Figure 1 in appendix 4 (see document .gif) illustrates the
dependence of on and assuming that , and .
It is important to point out that the way depends on is aﬀected by
the value of : for a given value of , is a negative function of . Similarly
for a given value of , the derivative is a negative function of .
We have assumed that supply shocks are
permanent. This hypothesis implies that past supply shock have no eﬀects
on the equilibrium interest rate. This absence of any in uence of on is
indeed necessary to allow the uncovered interest rates parity condition (2.10) to

























   e
ε
ε>
ε   
 
ε 
 .  


























the eﬀect of on so that the right-side of (2.10) remains unchanged.
Therefore must also remain unchanged on the left-side of (2.10). This re-
sult in turn explains why past supply shocks have a unit coeﬃcient in the
equilibrium equity price equation. This coeﬃcient re ects the fact that, at a
stationary equilibrium and in the absence of any reaction of to , expected
real asset prices have a unit elasticity with respect to expected real dividend (an
implication of eq. (2.5)). Real dividends are proportional to real output and,
from eq. (2.3), expected real output in turn depends on with a unit coef-
 cient. In response to a positive value of aggregate demand must increase
to stabilize the output gap. Since interest rates do not react, this adjustment
operates through an increase of equity prices and a decrease of exchange rates.
The necessary downwards adjustment of exchange rates therefore depends on
the relative impact of both kinds of assets on aggregate demand. This argument
explains that the magnitude of the negative eﬀect of on decreases when
increases. If , a variation of is unnecessary since .
It may be observed that has a negative eﬀect on equity prices, interest rates
and exchange rates. A random increase of the risk premium on the stock market
( ) decreases equity prices (see eq. (2.5)) and depresses aggregate demand
(see eq. (2.1)). In response the Central Bank adjusts interest rates downwards,
which implies a decline of exchange rates (see eq. (2.10)). These reactions de-
scribe the initial eﬀects of the shock. The initial eﬀects are the most important
to determine the  nal outcome, but the full path to the equilibrium solution
involves additional interactions between the variables. The decline of exchange
rates lowers the decrease of aggregate demand and makes unnecessary a con-
tinuation of the downward movement of interest rates. Moreover the decline
of interest rates has a positive eﬀect on equity prices (an eﬀect which does not
fully oﬀset the initial depression of equity prices), which feeds into aggregate
demand (already directly supported by declining interest rates) and stabilizes
the system.
The dependence of the monetary policy reaction to on and is illustrated
by  gure 2 (see appendix 4 in document .gif), using the same value as above for
.
The negative eﬀect of on equity prices increases with the magnitude of
and A higher value of implies that a smaller depreciation of the exchange
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rate is necessary to make aggregate demand go up again to its equilibrium value.
A smaller depreciation of the exchange rate necessitates a smaller decrease of
interest rates. A higher value of implies that a smaller fall of interest rates is
required to push up aggregate demand to its equilibrium value. In both cases a
smaller fall of interest rates implies that stocks go less up again after the initial
fall. Therefore the initial fall is less oﬀset by the upward movement caused by
the fall of interest rates. The negative eﬀect of on the exchange rate increases
with the magnitude of
The speculative shock on currency markets, has a negative eﬀect on
exchange rates and equity prices, but a positive eﬀect on interest rates. A spec-
ulation attack against the domestic currency ( ) depreciates the exchange
rate and boosts aggregate demand. In response to this variation of the output
gap, the Central Bank increases the interest rate. Equity prices then decline.
Declining equity prices and increasing interest rates cause aggregate demand to
fall back after its initial surge. Increasing interest rates also cause the exchange
rate to go up again, without fully ofsetting its initial fall. The dependence of
the monetary policy reaction to on and is illustrated by  gure 3 (see
appendix 4 in document .gif), using the same value as above for .
The negative eﬀect of on the equilibrium exchange rate increases with the
magnitude of and A higher value of implies that a smaller increase of
interest rates is suﬃcient to make aggregate demand fall to the equilibrium level
of output. Similarly, a higher value of implies that a smaller fall of equity
prices, and therefore a smaller increase of interest rates, is suﬃcient to make
aggregate demand fall back to its equilibrium level. A smaller rise of interest
rates in turn implies that the exhange rate does less go up again and does less
oﬀset its initial fall.
The negative eﬀect of on equity prices increases with the magnitude of
A bigger value of indeed implies a bigger increase of aggregate demand in
response to the depreciation of the exchange rate. This bigger hike of aggregate
demand necessitates a bigger increase of interest rates to restore equilibrium,
and causes therefore a bigger fall of equity prices.
An increase of the equilibrium value of real pro ts increases
equity prices. The partial derivative of equity prices to real dividends is indeed
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4.3.4. Eﬀects of foreign interest rates and in ation
5. Interaction of monetary and  scal policies under a pub-
lic debt solvency constraint
to real dividends (see eq. (2.5)). Real pro ts also have a positive eﬀect on the
nominal exchange rate, increasing with and decreasing with A higher value
of implies that a given increase of real dividends (a smaller value of caused
by an increase of productivity, or a fall of real wages), implying a proportional
increase of real stock prices, has a bigger eﬀect on aggregate demand and requires
a bigger increase of interest rates to push down aggregate demand. A higher
value of implies that the induced appreciation of the exchange rate leads
to a sharper downward reaction of aggregate demand, implying that a smaller
appreciation is necessary to push down aggregate demand. The net eﬀect of an
increase of pro tability on interest rates is null.
In the equilibrium interest rate solution, the constant term is a logical
outcome. Absent stochastic terms, domestic interest rates are equal to foreign
interest rates plus the long term expected in ation diﬀerential. Equity prices
decrease when the foreign interest rate goes up. A hike of foreign interest rates
initially implies a depreciation of the exchange rates which boosts aggregate
demand. The Central Bank reacts and raises interest rates. Equity prices then
fall. In the exchange rate solution, the term re ects a kind
of purchasing power parity condition. Of course, a hike of real foreign interest
rates depreciates the domestic exchange rate.
In this section we introduce a  scal policy component in aggregate demand,
so that equation 1.1 becomes
(5.1)
The new variable measures the real primary public de cit per unit of
natural output. The primary de cit is the diﬀerence between public expenses
without interest payments and public receipts. The real primary de cit is di-
vided by the natural ouput level to obtain . The  scal policy variable
must respect a public debt solvency constraint, inspired by Krichel, Livine and
Pearlman (1996), and Van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995). This very simple
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It has to be pointed out that with this strong form of solvency constraint, a positive primary
de cit is only allowed if in ation exceeds the nominal interest rate, thus if the real nominal
interest rate is negative. A stationary long term equilibrium is only conceivable with an absence
of primary de cit and a null real interest rate. This equilibrium value of the real interest rate is
compatible with the absence of real growth in the model.
Artus (1998)). This particular constraint is the right one in a model where ex-
pected output is equal to a constant natural level. In this context indeed, such
a constraint is equivalent to requiring that the ratio of real debt on output be
constant. The solvency constraint establishes a strong link between  scal and
monetary policies, since the latter determines the level of in ation and therefore
the level of seignorage. Since some form of real debt stabilization requirement is
binding in most industrial countries, with the example of the European Stability
Pact, it is important to address the question of how such a constraint modi es
the optimal reaction of monetary policy to asset prices  uctuations.
After linearisation (see Appendix 4), this constraint requires that :
(5.2)
where is the natural level of production ( ), and is the real public
debt. For a given interest rate, an increase of the real primary de cit, augment-
ing the real debt, has to be compensated by an increase of in ation (seignorage)
to reduce the real public debt .
We have solved the new model obtained by replacing equation (2.1) with
equation (5.1) and adding equation (5.2). Our main results may be summarized
the following way : the introduction of the solvency constraint lowers the nom-
inal interest rate increase which is required to stabilize output and in ation in
response to a  nancial asset price variation or an exchange rate depreciation
which would increase aggregate demand. For a given price perception de-
termined by monetary policy, any increase in the nominal interest rate implies
a decrease of to meet the solvency constraint. Any restriction of monetary
policy thus implies a corresponding restriction of  scal policy. Therefore the
necessary upward reaction of interest rates to positive shocks on stock prices or
negative shocks on exchange rate is lower than what would be required in the
absence of such a  scal policy adjustment.
Technically, the solutions for and are the same as those given by eqs.
(4.10), (4.11), (4.12 ), where must be replaced with . In particular,
it is clear that replacing with lowers the coeﬃcients of and in
24 
6. Conclusion
the interest rate solution.
In this paper we have clari ed some of the issues about the relations between
 nancial asset prices and monetary policy. The analysis of the former sections
has led us to understand how monetary policy has to react to exogenous  nancial
shocks and how the conduct of monetary policy has to take account of induced
endogenous variations of  nancial asset prices. The complex interactions be-
tween interest rates, exchange rates and equity prices is summarised by the
properties of a monetary conditions index which is derived from an optimising
problem.
Several lessons may be drawn from our analysis :
- When monetary policy takes account of the role played by  nancial prices in
the monetary transmission mechanism the optimal monetary policy reaction to a
demand shock is inferior to what it would have been otherwise. This reduction
of the magnitude of the interest rates reaction increases with the impact of
 nancial prices on aggregate demand.
- This feature of the solutions has interesting implications since there are
good reasons to assume that the impacts of  nancial prices on aggregate de-
mand change over time. For example it may be suspected that the sensibility
of consumer demand with respect to the value of equities has recently increased
as the result of increasing stock holding by households. Therefore should have
increased. An important consequence of this structural change is that the op-
timal monetary policy reaction to demand shocks should have decreased. This
argument would imply a reduction of the volatility of intervention interest rates
for a given level of the variance of aggregate demand.
- In an in ation targeting framework, monetary policy must react to unan-
ticipated changes in asset prices only to the extent that they aﬀect the output
gap and thus the in ation outlook.
- To correctly assess the optimal response of interest rates to exogenous
changes of the stochastic risk premia on equity prices and exchange rates, is is
necessary to include both kinds of  nancial prices in the model because of their
interaction.
- The optimal monetary policy response to  nancial shocks also depends on
the assumed functioning of the economy and we have shown that a public debt
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8. Appendix 1: Derivation of linear approximation (2.6)
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The wedge between real output and real wage costs is given by where
is real output, is the real wage and is total employment. We simply
assume that employment is proportional to output: and the  ow of real
dividends becomes : . In logarithms, we obtain
. The expression is also equal to and
can be approximated around an arbitrary value of by the formula
. We thus obtain the approximation of
equation (2.6 ) with and
. When the real wage level around which we realize the approximation
is equal to , is equal to and when is small, is roughly equal to which
is the inverse labour productivity rate.
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which can be substituted into eq.(9.3) to yield
(9.7)
Taking the expectations on date t-1 of both sides of this equation we obtain :
(9.8)
Lagging eq. (9.6) one period yields :
(9.9)
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Leading this equation one period we obtain
(9.11)
This equation is a second order linear diﬀerence equation. To solve it forward,
we rewrite (9.1) using the lag operator :
(9.12)
Dynamic stability requires that
and . Substituting from 9.2 and 9.4 these conditions reduce
to , and , . These conditions
are satis ed under the reasonable hypotheses that , , and
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Following the same procedure we obtain a second order linear diﬀerence equation
for :
(9.16)
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Substituting eqs. (9.2) and (9.4) into eqs. (9.15) and (9.17) we obtain solutions
(4.10) and (4.11) in the main text. To derive these solutions, we have used some




We represent the nominal public debt with . The dynamics of this variable
are given by
(10.1)
where is the nominal primary public de cit. Dividing both sides of the




where the real primary de cit , while and (X
represents the real public debt level).
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(10.5)
The Taylor  rst order approximation of the equation (10.5), around the null
value for and , is equal to By de nition is equal to . Therefore,
we obtain the equation (5.2).
34